Introduction
As providers of information, the media provide the key infrastructure for governance and a well-functioning polity: "the central purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with accurate and reliable information they need to function in a free society" (Pew Research Center 2009 ).
Historically, the media were so important to politics that they were recognized as the "fourth estate," the first three estates being the clergy, nobility, and commoners (Wikipedia 2010 ).
Owing to their broad and possibly targeted reach, the media have become an essential vehicle for advertising and public relations.
The ostensible function of the media is to report the news and inform their audience.
However, it is widely believed that news reports go beyond conveying information to influencing behavior, that is, that the media do not just report the news, but also, "make" or "define" the news (Alsem et al. 2008) . The media might influence behavior through pure exposure by selecting what to report (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004; George and Waldfogel 2006) as well as slant and spin in what is reported (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Xiang and Sarvary 2007) .
Most empirical studies of the impact of the media on individual behavior have focused on electoral politics, an area in which the bulk of developments, news, opinions/views, and policies are conveyed to individuals through the media (Strömberg 2004; . The literature has documented that the media has a strong and robust influence on voting behavior. For example, by substituting for other media such as newspapers and radio, television decreased voter turnout (Gentzkow 2006 Washington, D.C., exposure to newspapers raised voter turnout in a gubernatorial election but media slant had no effect (Gerber et al. 2009 ); the closure of the Cincinatti Post reduced voter turnout and campaign spending and resulted in incumbents becoming more likely to win re-election (Schulholfer-Wohl and Garrido 2009).
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There have been relatively few studies of the impact of news reports on consumer behavior outside of the political arena. While news reports are a primary channel of voter information about politics, news reports are only one (arguably secondary) channel by which information about non-political goods and services is communicated to consumers. The major channels of communication are advertising and in-store promotions, supplemented by "word of mouth" (Kotler and Keller 2008) .
From the viewpoint of industry, the great attraction of media publicity as a way of communicating information about goods and services is that it is, apparently, "free," whereas advertising and sales promotion are costly (Smith 2008) . However, in 2008, U.S. public relations expenditures on wages for managers and specialists alone totaled $19.42 billion, as compared with wage expenditures on advertising managers of just $3.42 billion.
2 Hence, industry indeed spent considerable resources to cultivate the "free" publicity.
Given the substantial expenditures, it is imperative to assess the role of the media on consumer behavior. However, despite the apparent attractiveness of media publicity and the considerable expenditures, industry lacks guidance about the effectiveness of media publicity or indeed how to measure publicity -whether in terms of number of media reports or the content of the reports (Smith 2008) . Further, while we know that media slant and bias affect 1 A separate but related literature studies how individuals demand slant in newspapers. Gentzkow and Shapiro (forthcoming) compiled an index of political slant based on phrases frequently used by Democrat vis-à-vis Republican members of Congress. They found that readers systematically preferred newspapers with slant, and newspapers responded to the readers' preferences by tailoring their news reporting. This finding is generally consistent with a setting in which Bayesian consumers make quality inference of media based on the match of the media reports to their prior expectations (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006) , and with settings in which the media confer positive "preference externalities" Waldfogel 2003, 2006 provides a neat setting in which to study the impact of news reports on consumer choice.
We assembled a rich and novel data-set from multiple sources. Unlike prior studies of media impact which focused on overall slant of the media (and so technically looked at the media itself rather than the reporting), we focus on actual reporting. Our data-set includes all reports of the DNC registry in 117 newspapers that were circulated in more than 2,800 U.S.
counties. We matched the registration rates and news reports with an array of newspaper and county demographic characteristics to compile a cross-section of DNC registrations, newspaper reports, and county characteristics. We then related DNC registrations to various measures of newspaper reports to identify their impact in a regression model.
The key issue in the econometric estimation was to distinguish the impact of news on DNC registration from the reverse effect, that newspapers increased reporting of the DNC registry because of an increase in registrations. In addition to including a battery of demographic controls, we applied three different identification strategies. The first focused on news reports published before the opening of the DNC registry. Clearly, these news reports could not have been driven by consumer registrations. The next strategy applied a difference-in-differences estimation strategy according to the extent to which the state added telephone numbers from a state-level do not call registry to the federal registry. The responsiveness of consumers to the federal registry would be lower in which a larger proportion of telephone numbers were registered by the state. The third strategy applied instrumental variables, using staff size and newsprint consumption as instruments for news reports. Using the three approaches, we found robust evidence that newspaper reports did increase DNC registration. The estimates implied that a one percent increase in the number of news reports raised the number of DNC registrations by 0.02 to 0.06 percent.
The three approaches above allowed us to test the overall impact of newspaper reports on consumer choice, and measure the "sales-response function" in our context. In addition,
we compiled various characteristics of the newspaper reports to explore the extent to which the content of the newspaper reports affected DNC registration. We found little evidence that the content of news reports affected DNC registration more than the report itself.
Finally, motivated by the studies of the impact of media reports on electoral politics, we investigated the impact of media slant or bias on consumer behavior in the DNC context.
To do so, we compared the impact on DNC registration of reports in Democratic, Republican, vis-à-vis unaffiliated newspapers, and found that only reports in unaffiliated newspapers affected DNC registration.
Related literature
One of the celebrated 4Ps of marketing strategy is promotion, which comprises advertising, publicity, and sales promotion. Marketing scholars have extensively studied advertising and sales promotion (see, e.g., Fornell et al. 1985; Narasimhan 1988; Sasieni 1989; Blattberg et al. 1995; van Heerde et al. 2004; Chintagunta et al. 2006; Johnson and Myatt 2006; Sigué and Chintagunta 2009 ). However, there has been relatively less attention to publicity despite its obvious importance in marketing and consumer behavior.
The limited academic research on publicity has focused on its impact on consumer attitudes, or the impacts of specialized publicity, specifically, consumer "word of mouth," or the impact of publicity in the political arena. For example, through a series of laboratory experiments, Ahluwalia et al. (2000) found that the effect of publicity on consumer attitudes toward a product is moderated by the extent of the consumers' commitment. They manipulated publicity using synthetic positive and negative newspaper articles, and found that consumers who were more committed to the product were more responsive to positive publicity and less responsive to negative publicity.
Similarly, postings on the Yahoo Movies Web site affected box-office sales, especially in the weeks immediately after the movie opening (Liu 2006) , and consumer reviews on the Amazon and Barnes and Noble websites affected sales of the corresponding books (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006) . However, the "word of mouth" studies provide little guidance as to the impact of general publicity, as distinct from targeted reviews or synthetic product reviews in a laboratory, on consumer choices.
In the political arena, Strömberg (2004) found that media coverage may inform consumers about elections and may in turn affect government policies. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2004) , , Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) , and Xiang and Sarvary (2007) studied the underlying structure of the media market -why the media have incentives to produce slanted and biased news, how competition might affect media diversity and news quality, and whether consumers demand slanted news. The studies of voting behavior, however, were generally founded on the overall slant of the media. That is, they assumed that news reports would follow the political stance of the medium, and their unit of analysis was effectively the medium rather than any particular event or incident. While these assumptions might be appropriate in electoral politics, they offer limited guidance on the effectiveness of the media as a publicity channel for an item which is not obviously political.
Focusing specifically on economics news, Alsem et al. (2008) related coverage in two Dutch newspapers to consumer and producer confidence. They applied the vector autoregression (VAR) method and found that newspaper reports had little influence on both consumer and producer confidence on the economy. They selected, however, only one day of newspapers in each month, asked graduate students to rate the overall impression presented by the newspapers on the overall economy, and used the ratings to measure monthly media intensity. Hence, multiple sources of measurement errors could have reduced the statistical significance of the newspaper influence. Kalaitzandonakes et al. (2004) conducted an empirical analysis using an approach that is perhaps closest to our study. In the context of processed foods, they found that consumer purchase of taco shells was significantly related to the frequency of news reports of the recall of products contaminated with genetically-engineered corn. Similar to our study, they constructed the media coverage variable by transcribing articles from various U.S.
newspapers. Their study, however, did not account for possible endogeneity in newspaper reports, specifically, that the extent of media coverage might have been caused by the drop in consumer purchases and increased public interest.
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Generally, the main challenge in studying the impact of media publicity on consumer behavior lies in compiling the coverage and reports relevant to a particular event or incident, and in robustly identifying the effect given the possible endogeneity of media coverage. In our study, we address these challenges by comprehensively transcribing all newspaper reports of the DNC registry from June 1, 2003 to June 27, 2004, and addressing possible endogeneity through multiple demographic controls and three different identification strategies.
Data
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) opened the federal DNC registry on June 27, 2003. The registry applies to both interstate and intrastate telemarketing calls. Telemarketers are required to remove numbers on the DNC registry from their call lists every 31 days.
5 Outside of the realm of consumer choice, newspaper reports have been shown to affect stock markets. "Abreast of the Market" is a daily column in the Wall Street Journal that reviews the U.S. stock market, and particularly, the stocks comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Tetlock (2007) found that, between 1984 and 1999, the sentiment of the column affected the DJIA index as well as trading volumes. Pessimistic columns led to downward pressure on the index, while unusually high or low pessimism in the column increased market trading volume.
Violators are subject to fines of up to $11,000 per offence. Registration for the DNC service is free to consumers and can be completed by either telephone call or the Internet. 
where R j is the number of reports of DNC in newspaper j, and c ij is the circulation of newspaper j in county i. 2005a ). In one set of analyses, we applied a difference-in-differences strategy, exploiting differences in the response of DNC registration to news reports according to the extent to which telephone numbers on the state registry were added to the federal registry.
We compiled the percentage of state-registered numbers added to the federal registry from an FTC (2003) report. However, the FTC report was incomplete in that it did not cover all states that added their state registries to the federal DNC registry. For instance, it excluded Pennsylvania, which subsequently added its state-registered telephone numbers to the federal registry. Accordingly, we limited the difference-in-differences estimates to those states without a prior state registry or those with a state registry covered by the FTC report. Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics and correlations of the data. Our data-set, including characteristics of the newspapers and newspaper reports, demographics, and 2004 presidential election information, was specified at the county level.
14 <<Insert Tables 1 and 2 here>>
Model
The basic model for analysis is a cross-sectional county-level regression of the form:
where i Q is the number of DNC registrations in county i, i I , as defined in (1) We used a cross-sectional specification because most of our variables in the data-set, 14 We selected the county as the unit of analysis for two reasons. First, we could associate each registration with a county but not any individual newspaper or newspaper report. Second, a registration may be influenced by multiple newspaper reports (e.g., people read one newspaper at home and another at the workplace (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008) ), and so measurement errors would arise if we associated each DNC registration to a single newspaper report.
particularly the newspaper characteristics that we used as instrumental variables for DNC news reports, did not vary across time. We specified all continuous variables in logarithms.
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In one identification strategy, we applied difference-in-differences among counties according to the extent to which telephone numbers registered with a state-level DNC registry were added to the federal registry. Referring to (2), suppose that
where i S is the percentage of registrations added from the state registry (number of DNC registrations added from state registry divided by total number of DNC registrations).
Substituting in (2), we have
Our hypothesis was that 1 0   , since the impact of newspaper reports should be smaller to the extent that the state added state-registered telephone numbers to the federal registry.
Results
Telemarketing and consumer privacy are regulated by federal and state governments but not county governments. Accordingly, to control for any possible regulations at the state level, we included state fixed effects in all subsequent estimations and estimated standard errors using the Huber-White adjustment, clustered by state. With the inclusion of state fixed effects and robust clustered standard errors, our analysis focused on explaining differences in registrations from state-wide averages. 15 Where necessary, we added one to the variable before applying the logarithms to avoid logarithms of zeroes. The double-log specification allowed us to directly interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities. Moreover, empirical analyses of economic variables often fit better with the variables specified in logarithm (Wooldridge 2006: 197-200) . Also, we included the number of households (in logarithm) as an explanatory variable, and so the dependent variable in (2) was equivalent to the county-level registration rate.
We first estimated an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of DNC registrations on various demographic factors that have been previously identified as affecting DNC registrations. These covariates were the number of households, household size and income, commuting time, unemployment rate and retail density (Varian et al. 2004; Goh et al. 2009 ).
As reported in Table 1 , column (i), the results were generally consistent with previous findings.
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<<Insert Table 3 here>> We next estimated (2), as a baseline model of the impact of the number of news reports (weighted by circulation), i I , on DNC registrations over the entire period of study.
As reported in Table 3 , column (ii), the estimated coefficient of the number of news reports, 0.021 (±0.007), was positive and statistically significant. As the dependent variable (DNC registrations) and the number of news reports were specified in logarithms, the coefficient was the estimated elasticity. Accordingly, a one percent increase in newspaper reports of the DNC registry, weighted by circulation in a county, was associated with a 0.021 percent increase in DNC registrations in the county. To set the estimated elasticity in context, it was about one-fifth of the average short-term advertising elasticity, 0.109, as reported in a metaanalysis (Sethuraman and Tellis 1991) . Our result suggests that the estimated impact of newspaper reports is substantially smaller than that of advertising.
An obvious concern with this baseline analysis is that, although we included various demographic controls, the results might be explained by reverse causation or some omitted variables. While the news reports could have increased DNC registrations, it is also possible 16 The number of registrations should increase with number of households in the county. The likelihood that a person would pick up a telemarketing call would be lower in a larger household, and so large households may have a lower demand for DNC. High income or employed people may incur a higher time cost in receiving telemarketing calls, and so income may positively and unemployment may negatively correlate with DNC registrations. Finally, retail density may reflect the demand for shopping, and so in regions that have relatively more retail shops, the consumer demand for DNC may also be lower because they are more receptive of telemarketing.
that the newspapers were spurred by the overwhelming response to the opening of the DNC registry to report the event. Also, some unobserved factors or incidents, such as adjustments of telemarketing practices following the opening of the federal DNC registry, could affect both registration and news reports contemporaneously. To rule out reverse causation and omitted variables, we applied three different identification strategies.
Newspaper reports: Day 1
First, we focused on news reports published between June 1-26, 2003, and sign-ups with the DNC registry on the opening day, June 27, 2003. Clearly, news reports published before June 27 could not have been influenced by registrations on June 27. The sample size was much smaller than in the estimate over the full period of study. The reason is that, as Figure   1 shows, news reporting was very subdued until the launch of the federal DNC registry. Table 3 , column (iii), reports the estimates. The coefficient of news reports, 0.061 (±0.024), was positive and statistically significant. Importantly, the elasticity, 0.061 (±0.024), was substantially larger than the elasticity, 0.021 (±0.007), as estimated using news reports and DNC registrations over the entire period of study. This difference is expected for two reasons. First, the pre-launch news reports would have built up a pent-up demand for the DNC registry when it opened. Second, the people who registered early would be those with the strongest preference for the DNC registry, leaving those with weaker preference (and less sensitive to news reports) to register later.
Newspaper reports: Difference-in-differences
Next, we applied a difference-in-differences strategy, exploiting differences between counties according to the extent to which telephone numbers on the state-level DNC registry were added to the federal registry. As a preliminary, we compared newspaper coverage in counties with and without state-level registries. As reported in <<Insert Table 4 here>> Table 3 , column (iv), reports the estimate of model (4). 17 The coefficients of the various demographic controls were similar to those in the regression of model (1) ( Table 3, column (ii)). The coefficient of news reports, 0.023 (±0.011), was positive and significant, and slightly larger than the estimate in model (1).
Importantly, the coefficient of the interaction between the number of news reports and the percentage of numbers added by the state, -0.044 (±0.018), was positive and significant.
This was consistent with the hypothesis that 1 0   , i.e., to the extent that consumers had their telephone numbers registered through the state registry, they would be less responsive to news reports of the federal DNC registry. Based on the average state addition of 42.7%, the elasticity of DNC registration with respect to news reports in a county with the average registration through a state registry was 0.023 -0.044 x 0.427 = 0.004, or about one-fifth of the elasticity in a county with no state registry.
Newspaper reports: Instrumental variables
Our third identification strategy was to estimate the structural impact of newspaper reports on DNC registrations using instrumental variable (IV) regressions. The ideal IVs in this context would be factors that shifted newspapers' reporting of DNC, but not DNC registration itself.
One plausible instrument for the number of news reports of DNC registration was the staff size of the newspaper. A newspaper with a larger staff would be likely to employ more journalists and reporters, and so produce more content, including reports of DNC registration.
However, it is unlikely that the setting up of the federal DNC registry, which is not a major, sustained issue, would materially affect the staff size of a newspaper.
Another plausible instrument was the annual newsprint consumption of the newspaper, adjusted by the newspaper's circulation. 18 A newspaper that consumed more newsprint, relative to circulation, would have room for more news reports, including reports of DNC registration. However, it is unlikely that the establishment of the federal DNC registry would affect annual newsprint consumption.
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We performed the IV estimation using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Table 3 Upon considering the various specifications and diagnostics, we preferred the basic model, (2), estimated by OLS over the whole period, as reported in Table 3 , column (ii). This specification was parsimonious, was easy to interpret, and provided an estimate of the elasticity of DNC registration with respect to news reports, 0.021 (±0.07), which was relatively conservative. The preferred specification was buttressed by estimates using three identification strategies.
Content
Having established the impact of newspaper reports on DNC registration, a further issue was the impact of the specific content of the news reports. To explore this question, we extracted various characteristics of the newspaper reports -whether the report included a toll-free number or URL, or mentioned the number of people registering, and the length of the headline and main text.
It is important to note that content was conditional on the occurrence of a news report.
Only if a newspaper published a report on the DNC registry could it include the toll-free number, URL, etc. Hence, as is evident from Table 2 , the number of news reports and content variables were highly collinear (all correlations exceeded 0.90). Accordingly, given the limited sample size, it was infeasible to include both the number of news reports and the measure of content in a single regression.
<<Insert Table 5 here>> Hence, we separately estimated the impacts of the various measures of content on DNC registration. As reported in Table 5 , the results were very similar for the various measures. The estimated elasticities with respect to news reports, inclusion of toll-free number or URL, and mention of the number of registrations were very close, ranging from 0.024 ( 0.007) to 0.027( 0.009), as compared with 0.021 (± 0.007) for the number of news reports. The estimated elasticities with respect to the length of the headline and main text
were not much different.
To gain deeper insight into the impact of the news contents, in the next set of analyses, we partitioned the newspaper reports according to whether they did or did not include a specific type of content -toll-free number, URL, or number of people registering. Using the preferred specification but limiting the measure of news reports to those that did or did not include the particular content, we then estimated the impact of news reports on DNC registrations. We were not able to enter more than one measure of content simultaneously because of high multicollinearity.
<<Insert Table 6 here>> As reported in Table 6 , in general, the results were similar to those from the previous analyses. Apparently, there was little difference in the impact of news reports that did or did not mention the toll-free number, URL, or the number of people registering.
Taken together, the results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the various dimensions of the content of news reports had roughly similar impact on DNC registration as the fact of the report itself. There being no difference in the impact of reports that did or did not mention the number of people registering suggests that the impact of news reports lay in exposure rather than influence.
However, we must caution that our news report and content variables were highly collinear, and so the above inferences were drawn based on separate estimation of their impacts. Integrating multiple measures of news content into a single nested estimation, with the measures of content being conditional on the report, would be a good direction for future research. This would provide more precise results on the issue of whether newspapers affect behavior through exposure or influence.
Politics
Given that newspaper reports had a robust influence on DNC registration, and in light of previous studies of the impact of newspapers on electoral politics, our final question was whether the politics of the newspaper had any impact on consumer registration. To address this question, we classified newspapers according to whether they endorsed the Republican, Democratic, or neither of the major-party candidates in the 2004 presidential election. We were able to identify the endorsements among 98 newspapers (or 84% of newspapers covered in our analysis), of which 35 endorsed the Republican candidate, 44 the Democratic candidate, and 5 neither major-party candidate.
Then, we re-constructed the newspaper report variables as
where p = Democratic, Republican, or Neutral. The model that we estimated was then
If the politics of the newspaper had no impact on consumer registration with the federal DNC registry, then Table 1 reports summary statistics of the number of news reports from Republican, Democratic, and neutral newspapers. Table 7 reports descriptive statistics of the content of the newspaper reports by the politics of the newspaper. Neutral newspapers published more reports about the DNC registry than Republican newspapers, which in turn, published more reports than Democratic papers, but the differences were not statistically significant. Based on the various measures of content, there seemed to be no statistically significant difference in the content of reports in newspapers by political affiliation.
<<Insert Table 7 here>> With regard to model (6), in the first estimate, we included the number of reports of the federal DNC registry in Republican newspapers, the Republican vote, and the interaction of the two political variables. As reported in Table 8 , column (i), news reports in Republican papers had no significant effect on DNC registrations, but Republican voters were more likely to register for DNC. The effect of Republican voting preference was robust -it continued to be significant in the full specification including reports in newspapers of all political affiliations. This factor in DNC registration was not noticed in previous demographic studies (Varian et al. 2004; Goh et al. 2009 ).
As reported in Table 8 , column (ii), news reports in Democratic papers had no significant effect on DNC registrations, while Democratic voters were less likely to register for DNC (the latter effect, however, was not robust to the inclusion of reports in newspapers of all political affiliations).
<<Insert Table 8 here>> As reported in Table 8 , column (iii), news reports in neutral newspapers (those that endorsed neither major party candidate in the 2004 Presidential election) had a significant and positive effect on DNC registration. The estimated elasticity, 0.020 (±0.008), was almost identical to that in the basic regression, 0.021 (±0.007) ( Table 3 , column (ii)). This result was similar to that in the full specification, including reports in newspapers of all political affiliations (Table 8 , column (iv)). However, the estimated elasticity of DNC registration with respect to the number of reports in neutral newspapers was somewhat smaller, 0.016 (± 0.009), and statistically less significant.
Taken together, the results in Table 8 imply that in the context of DNC registrations, the political bias of newspapers mattered -only reports in neutral newspapers had a significant impact on DNC registrations. It is striking that we found such a difference in DNC registrations, which was apparently a non-political issue that was supported by both major parties (see, for instance, the Congressional votes reported in the Washington Post 2010). However, we should caution that our sample included only five neutral newspapers.
An obvious explanation would be that news reporting differed between newspapers according to political affiliation. However, as reported in Table 7 , there seemed to be no (statistically significant) objective differences in coverage or content. Another possibility is that neutral newspapers gave more prominent or more favorable coverage to the DNC registry than Republican or Democratic newspapers. For instance, neutral newspapers might have placed reports of the DNC registry on the front page as compared with an inside page.
Or, neutral newspapers might have reported about the DNC registry with a more progovernment or pro-consumer slant.
In future research, it would be interesting to investigate whether neutral newspapers report about commercial and government services with systematically different prominence and slant as compared with Republican or Democratic newspapers. The findings would have obvious implications for public policy and managerial practice.
Implications
Through a series of structural estimations exploiting information from multiple sources on newspaper and county characteristics, we found robust evidence that newspaper reports of the federal DNC registry affected consumer behavior. Our results suggest guidance on the magnitude of the consumer response to newspaper publicity (i.e., the sales-response function).
While we found that newspaper reports had a significant economic impact, we must caution that DNC registration was free of charge. Consumers would have been more responsive to publicity about the DNC registry than to publicity about a commercially-provided item that must be paid for. Intuitively, we expect the demand for commercial items to be less sensitive to newspaper publicity, and we interpret our results to provide an upper bound to the salesresponse function.
An immediate avenue for further research would be to estimate the sales-response functions for the various consumer products with respect to the various media. Using the incremental margin (price less marginal cost), it would be straightforward to adapt the Dorfman-Steiner condition to calculate the profit maximizing level of publicity expenditure (Png and Lehman 2007: 208-211) . Such analyses would shed light on whether the U.S. expenditure of more than $19.42 billion per year on publicity exceeds or falls below the profit-maximizing level.
Government regulation of media and particularly policy to ensure diversity of media is typically justified by the need to ensure that the public has good information and so can make well-informed choices (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2008) . In an apparently non-political context, we have found that the political neutrality of newspapers matters for consumer choice. To the extent that our finding generalizes to commercially-provided goods and services, it is important that there be sufficient circulation of neutral media so that consumers would be well-informed. Our implication contrasts somewhat with political economy research, the findings of which point public policy towards media diversity. Our results suggest that increasing media diversity, if this means increasing the number of politically affiliated media, would not affect consumer behavior.
For managers, our findings suggest that they must attend to the political bias of media in directing their public relations effort. Instead of merely considering the reach (number of impressions) and demographics of readership, marketing managers must also attend to the politics of the media, and how the political orientation of the media interact with consumer preferences. For example, our results show that only politically neutral newspapers affected consumer decisions. To the extent that this generalizes to other goods and services, marketing managers would achieve greater impact by focusing their publicity efforts at such newspapers.
Limitations
This study is subject to several limitations. First, as we highlighted in Section 5.4, more data are needed to overcome multicollinearity so as to distinguish the impact due to the various dimensions of newspaper content. Second, our Factiva search yielded reports in only 117 of 1,197 U.S. newspapers audited by the Audit Bureau of Circulations. To the extent that reports in various newspapers are correlated and these are correlated with reports in television and other media -for example, through their publication of the same wire service reportsour estimates might have exaggerated the effect of news reports on consumer registrations.
Third, the impact of newspaper reports could be more precisely estimated if we had observations of consumer behavior at the level of individual newspapers. The challenge is that it is difficult to observe the characteristics of those who registered for DNC, and to associate each newspaper report with a particular individual/household. Fourth, we did not have any data on newspaper readership other than circulation. If the news reports exerted impact through self-selection of readership with characteristics different from the overall county demographics, then our estimates could have been biased.
It would be helpful to control for such unmeasured heterogeneity among the studied counties and newspapers, perhaps by augmenting the data-set with readership information.
Conclusions
Using observations of federal DNC registrations and comprehensive information on newspaper reports and other data that we compiled from multiple sources, we found robust evidence that newspaper reports significantly affected DNC registrations. Our estimate of 0.021 (±0.007) for the elasticity of the demand for DNC registration with respect to newspaper reports established an upper bound for the sales-response function with respect to media publicity. Further, we found that the political neutrality of newspapers mattered for the impact of newspaper reports on DNC registration.
This study reveals that an important marketing function -media publicity -interacts with politics. Even for an apparently non-political service, the impact of news reports depended on the political neutrality of the media. This suggests that, for public policy, media neutrality may be important for consumers to be well-informed even about apparently nonpolitical matters, and that media diversity as such may not necessarily help consumers. A business implication is that managers should pay close attention to the political slant of any media used as publicity channels.
In future research, it would be interesting to investigate whether media of different political affiliation report about commercial and government services with systematically different prominence and slant. The findings would have obvious implications for public policy and managerial practice.
Another interesting extension to this research is to study newspapers that had changed their political affiliations between the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections. Our conclusions would be strengthened if the impact due to the news reports changed according to the changing political affiliations of the newspapers. Also, future research into advertising could study the impact of political affiliation of media on the sales-response to advertising. Does the effectiveness of advertising also vary with the political bias of the media? This is
